Iranian Embassy Cover Up for IRGC Operatives in Nigeria

diplomaterrorism nigeria2

 

update from 29/08: ” Nigeria charged two of its citizens on Wednesday with assisting an Iranian militant cell in planning possible attacks on Israeli targets, alleging that one had traveled to Tehran and Dubai to receive cash and had known about spying on Israeli interests.”
On October 26th  2010, 13 shipping containers loaded with weapons (11 anti-tank weapons, 4 anti-tank mines, a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG), 21 RPG missiles, numerous 107 mm artillery rockets, 17 AK-47s, 2 sub-machine guns and 76 grenades) originating in Iran were seized by the authorities in Nigeria.

The Nigerians initially thought that the consignment of weapons was meant for “some local politicians to destabilize the country if they lose in upcoming elections“. They were later informed by Iran’s Ambassador Hussein Abdullahi that the final destination was Gambia and further investigations pointed to Senegal – both Gambia and Senegal cut off diplomatic relations with Iran following this incident.

In the meantime, Iran’s diplomatic services went into high gear to control damage. Iranian Foreign Minister at the time, Manouchehr Mottaki, flew out to Nigeria to meet his Nigerian counterpart, Odein Ajumogobia, for immediate damage control and then continued to Senegal where he was informed by Tehran that he had been sacked in absentia.

Meanwhile, two Iranian nationals who were implicated in the arms smuggling effort headed directly for the Iranian Embassy and hid there. One of them, Azami Aghajani, an IRGC member and businessman based in Tehran was finally apprehended and sentenced to 5 years in jail /sentenced to 17 year in jail in May 2013. The other suspect, Sayed Akbar Tabatabaei, the Commander of the IRGC-QF Africa Corps, entered Nigeria through a letter of recommendation by Iran’s foreign ministry and managed to escape investigations and Nigeria by claiming Diplomatic Immunity. Another IRGC officials suspected of involvement was identified as Esmail Ghani the Deputy Commander of the IRGC-QF whose authorities include “financial disbursements“.

This is a classic case in which the IRGC and its diplomatic counterpart tried to work together to diffuse an IRGC initiative that unfortunately for them was discovered.

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8 thoughts on “Iranian Embassy Cover Up for IRGC Operatives in Nigeria

  1. Am I missing something or am I correct that you use the acronym IRGC four times without explaining what it means?

  2. May the Almighty God in His surpassing greatness deal ruthlessly with those who find pleasure in inflicting pain, sorrow on the innocent people mostly, spreading hatred and unending conflicts over the world. They have unforgiving spirits and tie everything to religion. We deserve a happier world. May HE silence them from time to time in utter disgrace and shame. Amen. Enough is enough.

  3. Pingback: The Terror Threat and Iran’s Inroads in Latin America | Action for Freedom

  4. Pingback: Iran’s Uranium Diplomacy in Africa | Shadow Diplomacy

  5. Pingback: With friends like these – Iranian Diplomacy in the Middle East (part 1) | Shadow Diplomacy

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